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The Role of Agricultural Growth 
in Poverty Reduction in Indonesia 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Indonesia experienced a rapid reduction in poverty during the strong 
economic growth pre-crisis period. By estimating the impact of sectoral 
economic growth components on consistently measured poverty rates 
across regions and over time, this study finds that agricultural growth is the 
largest factor behind the poverty reduction. Agricultural growth accounts for 
66 percent of the reduction in overall poverty, 55 percent of the reduction in 
urban poverty, and 74 percent of the reduction in rural poverty. The growth of 
industrial sector – which has been the emphasis of Indonesian development 
strategy – has statistically significant impact only on reducing urban poverty. 
Even so, the impact is much smaller than the impact of agricultural growth. 
This implies that efforts to push productivity and growth in the agricultural 
sector – where most of the poor have a livelihood – is the most effective 
channel to reduce poverty. Furthermore, redirecting industrialization process 
to put more emphasis on developing integrated agro-industries with strong 
linkages to agriculture will certainly help in reducing poverty.  
 
  1 
I.  Introduction 
Before hit by the recent economic crisis starting in mid 1997, Indonesia was 
considered as one of the most successful countries in the world in the 
endeavor to reduce poverty. The proportion of population living below the 
“official” poverty line dropped from around 40 percent in 1976 to around 11 
percent in 1996. In absolute number, even though the total number of 
population increased from around 135 million in 1976 to around 200 million 
in 1996, the number of officially poor population decreased markedly from 
around 54 million people to around 22.5 million people during the same 
period.
3
  
There are methodological questions as to whether BPS poverty rates are 
comparable over time as well as across urban-rural areas – which will be 
addressed later in this study. Nevertheless, this clearly point out that 
Indonesia has experienced a rapid reduction in poverty during the pre-crisis 
period. In fact, if anything, the BPS methodology undermines the rate of 
reduction in poverty over time as BPS updated the standard of living 
represented by the poverty lines from time to time.
4
  
The rapid reduction in poverty in Indonesia has generally been attributed to 
the pre-crisis high economic growth experienced by the country. Prior to the 
crisis, Indonesia was one of the most rapidly growing economies in the 
world. Between 1986 and 1996, the average of real GDP growth was more 
than 7 percent per year. Furthermore, other social indicators also improved 
significantly during the pre-crisis period: life expectancy increased, infant 
mortality rates fell, and school enrollment rates rose. In addition, the 
provision of basic infrastructure – water supplies, roads, electricity, schools, 
health facilities – also rose significantly.  
However, beginning in mid 1997 Indonesia was struck by a currency crisis, 
which by the first half of 1998 had already developed into a full blown 
economic and political crisis, exacerbated by a natural disaster (El Nino 
drought). During this crisis period, the Indonesian people witnessed the value 
of their currency fell to as low as 15 percent of its pre-crisis value in less than 
one year, an economic contraction by an unprecedented magnitude of 13.7 
percent in 1998, skyrocketing domestic prices and particularly those of food,
5
 
mass rioting in the capital Jakarta and a few other cities, and culminated in 
                                                 
3
 BPS (2000).  
4
 Pradhan et al. (2001).  
5
 The general inflation rate was 78 percent in 1998, while food prices escalated by 118 
percent. 
     2 
the fall of the New Order government – which had been in power since mid 
1960s – in May 1998.
6
  
The social impact of the crisis, in particular on poverty, was substantial. An 
estimate indicates that the national poverty rate increased from around 16 
percent in February 1996 to 27 percent in February 1999.
7
 During the period, the 
number of urban poor doubled, while the rural poor increased by 75 percent. 
Another study which tracks down poverty rate over the course of the crisis 
shows that the poverty rate increased by 164 percent from the onset of the crisis 
in mid 1997 to the peak of the crisis around the end of 1998.
8
  
This has raised a question on the sustainability of poverty reduction achieved 
during the pre-crisis high economic growth era. In particular, the emphasis of 
development on industrialization has been questioned. During the crisis 
period, the agriculture sector fared much better than the other sectors. In 
1998, when real output shrank from the level in the previous year by 
unprecedented magnitudes of 9.2 percent in the industrial sector, 18 percent 
in the trade sector, and 19.6 percent in the services sector respectively, the 
output of the agriculture sector only slightly fell by 0.7 percent. In the 
following year, the agriculture sector led the recovery by growing positively at 
2.1 percent, helped by the industrial sector which grew by 1.4 percent, while 
the trade and services sectors were still in negative growth territory of 0.4 
and 1.5 percent respectively.  
This has led some to hypothesize that had Indonesia not industrialized “too 
fast” and instead focused on strengthening its basis in the agriculture sector, 
the country would not have been hurt so much by the economic crisis. 
Furthermore, had the country based its development strategy through 
developing the agricultural sector, the poverty reduction achieved would have 
been greater and more sustainable than that has been experience.  
This line of thinking is based on the notion that it is not only the rate of 
economic growth itself which is important, but also the “quality of growth” is 
equally important.
9
  One criterion for determining the quality of growth, 
though certainly not the only one, is its effects on the poor.
10
 What kinds of 
growth are most beneficial for the poor and hence most effective in reducing 
poverty? In search for an answer to this question, some researchers have 
                                                 
6
 The story of the Indonesian economic crisis and its possible proximate and deep causes 
has been told many times in academic (e.g. McLeod, 1998), official (e.g. World Bank, 
1999), and journalistic (e.g. Blustein, 2001) accounts.  
7
 See Pradhan et al. (2001).  
8
 See Suryahadi et al. (2000).  
9
 See Thomas et al. (2000).  
10
 Warr (2002).  
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focused on the composition of economic growth.
11
 Since in most poor 
countries the majority of the poor live in rural areas and are employed in 
agriculture, it seems logical that growth of agriculture is more important for 
poverty reduction than growth of industry or services.
12
  
The findings, however, have been mixed. Ravallion and Datt (1996) find that for 
the case of India indeed the growth of agricultural sector has been most effective 
in reducing poverty. They showed that 85 percent of the reduction in poverty in 
India was due to agricultural growth. On the other hand, Warr and Wang (1999) 
find that in Taiwan it is the growth of the industrial sector which has the largest 
impact on poverty reduction. Different still, Warr (2002), by pooling the data from 
four Southeast Asian countries (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines), finds that it is the growth of the services sector which accounts for 
the largest reduction in poverty in these countries.  
Given the concentration of the poor in the agricultural sector, the finding of 
Warr (2002) that poverty reduction in Indonesia has been driven mainly by 
the growth of services instead of agriculture contradicts the intuition, 
although not entirely implausible. It is very likely that the result was driven by 
the fact that data analyzed was a pooling of data from four countries. 
Therefore, it is quite possible that the finding reflects more on the situation in 
other countries, but less so for Indonesia. Hence, this study aims to re-asses 
the role of agricultural growth on poverty reduction as has been experienced 
by Indonesia. Specifically, this study re-estimates the elasticity of poverty 
reduction – measured using common indicators such as poverty headcount 
and poverty gap indices – with respect to agricultural versus non-agricultural 
growth, using data from Indonesia only. In addition, this study also estimates 
the marginal contribution of being employed in agriculture to the probability of 
being above poverty line, controlling for other relevant socio-economic 
factors, including community level variables. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter two describes the 
sources of data analyzed in this study. Chapter three discusses the role of 
agriculture in rural economy. Chapter four calculates the trends in poverty in 
Indonesia based on a consistently set standard of living and taking into 
account variations in prices both across regions and over time as well as 
estimates the marginal contribution of being employed in agriculture to the 
probability of being poor. Chapter five evaluates the impact of agricultural 
growth on poverty reduction in comparison with that of non-agricultural 
sectors. Chapter six provides an account of Indonesia’s past efforts in 
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 See, for example, Ravallion and Datt (1996), Warr and Wang (1999), Warr (2002).  
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 Dollar and Kray (2000), however, find that economic growth is associated with increases in 
incomes of the poor. Therefore, they argue that any growth is good for the poor.  
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reducing poverty. Chapter seven provides the conclusion and derives policy 
implications from the findings of this study. 
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II.  Data 
The main data source for the calculations of poverty in Indonesia is the 
Consumption Module of SUSENAS (the National Socio-Economic Survey) 
collected by Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik or BPS). SUSENAS 
is a nationally representative household survey, covering all areas of the 
country. The Consumption Module of SUSENAS is conducted every three 
years, specifically collecting information on very detailed consumption 
expenditures from around 65,000 households. Although SUSENAS was 
started in 1976, this study can only have access to the data collected in 
1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, and 1999.  
This study also utilizes the data from Core SUSENAS, which is conducted 
every year in the month of February, collecting information on the 
characteristics of over 200,000 households and over 800,000 individuals. 
The sample of households in the Consumption Module of SUSENAS is a 
randomly selected subset of the 200,000 households in the Core SUSENAS 
sample of the same year.  
In addition, this study also uses the data of Regional Gross Domestic 
Product (RGDP) and Regional Consumer Price Index (RCPI), both published 
by BPS. In line with the SUSENAS data, the RGDP data used are started 
from 1984 until 1999. For real RGDP, starting from the 1993 data BPS uses 
a new 1993 prices, while for the earlier series they used the 1983 prices. To 
get a consistent series of real RGDP, the earlier series are converted to the 
1993 prices. Meanwhile, the RCPI data are based on urban prices only.  
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III.  The Role of Agriculture in Rural Economy 
Industrialization was the heart of economic development strategy adopted by 
the Indonesian New Order government during its tenure in power from late 
1960s to late 1990s. This is true during both its earlier period up until the mid 
1980s which emphasized import substitution strategy as well as during its 
later period which emphasized export orientation strategy. As a 
consequence, the role of the agricultural sector in the national economy has 
continuously declined during the whole period, which is briefly discussed in 
the first section of this chapter. Nevertheless, agriculture remains an 
important source of livelihood for a large number of households, in particular 
in rural areas. This is discussed in the second section of this chapter. 
A.  The Macro Picture 
Indonesia entered a rapid economic growth phase following the launching of 
its first five-year development plan in 1969. Since then the country's 
economy has undergone significant changes. With an average real GDP 
growth of around seven percent annually during the pre-crisis period, 
Indonesia holds its place with the other rapidly growing East Asian 
economies. Since it started from a very low initial condition, however, its per 
capita income remains still far below its neighboring countries in absolute 
terms. In 1967, Indonesia's per capita income was around US$ 50 and it was 
one of the poorest countries in the world (Agrawal, 1996). Hill (1996) 
estimates that between 1965 and 1991 the real GDP per capita increased 
from 190 to 610, measured in 1991 US$, which constitutes growth of 4.6 
percent annually. 
Since the late 1960s, economic development in Indonesia can be divided 
into three phases. The first is from the late 1960s to mid 1970s, where 
Indonesia's “New Order” regime embraced trade and investment policies 
which were remarkably open for the period. In 1967, a foreign investment law 
that guaranteed foreign investors the right to repatriate capital and profits 
was passed. In 1970, there were reforms that reduced the existing barriers to 
goods trade and foreign borrowing by unifying the multiple exchange rate 
system and abolishing most of the exchange controls on capital and current 
account transactions. According to Aswicahyono et al. (1996), the 
government’s adherence to reasonably open trade and investment policies 
during this period was a legacy of the abrupt change in economic policy 
beginning in the mid 1960s. 
The second phase is from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s, where Indonesia 
adopted an inward-looking import-substitution strategy. Awash with revenue 
from oil exports, the government was eager to build capital intensive 
industries to replace imports. In addition, it spent a large sum of money in 
building infrastructure. Not surprisingly, the role of the public sector in the 
economy’s growth was dominant during this period. Aswicahyono et al. 
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(1996) argue that this change of policy resulted from tremendous internal 
pressure on the government to embark on a more interventionist path, 
especially in the area of industrial policy.  
The third phase started in mid 1980s when the Indonesian economy started 
to open again. This was an indirect result of the large drop in oil prices that 
began in the early 1980s (Hill, 1996). Because the oil revenue shrank 
quickly, the government faced a sudden external imbalance. The import 
substitution strategy had left the Indonesian industries inefficient and unable 
to compete in the world market at the maintained exchange rate. A 
combination of this and general decline in primary commodity prices raised 
the premium on foreign exchange. In 1986, the import substitution strategy 
was therefore discarded and replaced with export orientation, followed by a 
devaluation of the exchange rate and combined with deregulation in the 
domestic economy. 
During three decades of economic development starting in the early 1970s, 
the Indonesian economy underwent substantial structural change. Notable of 
this change is the reduction in the importance of the agricultural sector in the 
Indonesian economy. Table 1 compares the share of agriculture in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and its share in employment from 1971 to 2000. 
The shares of the agricultural sector in both GDP and employment have 
declined throughout the period. However, it appears that the reduction in 
agricultural GDP share has been much faster than its employment share. 
This is apparent from the declining ratio of GDP to employment share from 
0.67 in 1971 to 0.38 in 2000.  
 
Table 1. GDP and Employment Shares of Agriculture in Indonesia,  
1971-2000 (%) 
 1971 1980 1990 2000 
Gross Domestic Product 45 25 22 17 
Employment 67 55 50 45 
Ratio of GDP to employment 
share 
0.67 0.45 0.44 0.38 
Source: BPS, Statistik Indonesia (various years). 
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B.  Agriculture and Household Livelihood 
The macroeconomic picture discussed in the previous section clearly 
indicates that the role of the agricultural sector in the national economy has 
declined along with the industrialization of the economy. This is also 
reflected at the household level. Figure 1 shows the proportion of agricultural 
households – defined as households which derive most of their incomes 
from the agricultural sector – from the total households in both rural and 
urban areas. The data used in this figure is calculated from SUSENAS.  
 
Consistent with the national employment data in Table 1, Figure 1 shows 
that nationally the proportion of agricultural households declined from around 
55 percent in 1984 to 39 percent in 1999. Interestingly, most of the decline 
was driven by the decline in rural areas, while the proportion of agricultural 
households in urban areas was relatively stable between 8 and 10 percent. 
Nevertheless, in 1999 around 59 percent of rural households still derived 
most of their incomes from the agricultural sector. This indicates that 
agriculture still constitutes the most important source of livelihood for the 
majority of rural Indonesians. 
Figure 1.  Proportion of Agricultural Households in Indonesia, 1984-1999
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Figure 2 shows the total incomes of all agricultural households as a 
proportion of total incomes of all households.
13
 The data used in this figure is 
also calculated from SUSENAS. Even though declining, the numbers in this 
figure indicate that the role of agricultural income at the household level, 
particularly in rural areas, is much greater than those suggested by the GDP 
share of the agricultural sector shown in Table 1. While in urban areas the 
incomes of agricultural households only make up between 5 and 7 percent of 
the incomes of total households, in rural areas the proportion is still more 
than 50 percent.  
 
 
                                                 
13
 This is just a proxy for agricultural income as agricultural households derive some of their 
incomes from non-agricultural sectors and vice versa non-agricultural households derive 
some of their incomes from agriculture. 
Figure 2.  Share of Agricultural Households Income from Total Households Income
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IV.  Poverty Trends and Sectoral Profile of Poverty 
The method for measuring poverty has always been subjected to 
controversies.
14
 This is due to both definitional issues as well as the 
implications which may arise from the results of a poverty measurement 
exercise. The definition of poverty has evolved over time from the narrow 
definition of inability to fulfill the basic needs to incorporate broader aspects 
of life such as health and education, and more recently to include socio-
political dimensions such as voicelessness in the making of decisions that 
affect one’s own life.
15
 Meanwhile, counting the poor can also become the 
subject of controversies when the numbers calculated are used for practical 
policy purposes, such as allocating budget.  
 
A.  Measuring Poverty 
Despite acknowledging that there are more to poverty than simply the 
inability to fulfill the basic needs, this study uses the most widely used 
measure of poverty, which is the current consumption expenditure deficit. In 
this measure, a household is categorized as poor if its per capita 
consumption expenditure is less than a specified threshold, which is 
popularly known as the “poverty line”.  
At the surface, this method looks very simple. However, this simplicity is 
deceptive, as setting an absolute “poverty line” is a complex exercise. Even if 
one begins by accepting that the poverty line will be based on food 
expenditures necessary for nutritional adequacy and some allowance for 
“essential” non-food items, one still needs to answer to many questions. 
What level of nutrition is “adequate”? What mix of food commodities are to 
be included in a food poverty basket to achieve adequacy? What level of 
non-food purchases are “essential”? Ultimately there are no correct answers 
to any of these questions as each is a social convention. But any proposed 
method for providing answers should be complete, internally consistent, and 
provide a credible case for its particular choice of social convention.
16
 
The poverty measures analyzed here are the Foster-Greer-Torbecke (FGT) 
poverty indices (Foster et al., 1984). This class of poverty measures is highly 
regarded because it meets all the axioms desirable in consumption-based 
poverty measures and contains a parameter  that can be set according to 
society’s sensitivity to the income distribution among the poor.  
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 See Sen (1981) and Ravallion (1994).  
15
 See Narayan (2000), Narayan et al. (2000), and World Bank (2000).  
16
 Pradhan et al. (2001).  
     11 
Specifically, the FGT family of poverty measures is summarized by the 
formula:  







 







q
i
i
z
cz
N
P
1
1
)(

          (1) 
where N is the number of all households, z is the poverty line, ci is the per 
capita consumption (or income) of the i’th poor household, q is the number of 
poor households, and  is the weight attached to the severity of household 
poverty (or the distance from the poverty line).  
When  = 0, the FGT measure collapses to the headcount index, or P(0), i.e. 
the proportion of the population that is below the poverty line.
 
This measure, 
while useful for general poverty comparisons, is insensitive to differences in 
the depth of poverty in the sense that households far below the poverty line 
receive the same weight as households just below the poverty line. 
Moreover, as Deaton (1997) points out, it serves as an unsatisfactory 
indicator of welfare, for it is possible for this measure to indicate a decrease 
in poverty headcount when some very poor households become even poorer 
and some not so poor households’ expenditures increase sufficiently to push 
these households above the poverty line.  
This shortcoming is overcome by assigning higher values to the parameter . 
When  = 1, the FGT measure gives the poverty gap, or P(1), a measure of 
the average depth of poverty and indicates the population averaged money 
gap by which the consumption of the poor falls short of the poverty line. 
When  = 2, the FGT index is called the poverty severity index, or P(2). The 
P(2) measure differs from the P(1) measure because it assigns relatively 
more weight than the P(1) measure to individuals whose expenditures are 
further away from the poverty line and thus in more severe poverty. 
 
B.  Official Poverty Measurement in Indonesia  
Statistics Indonesia (BPS) is the government body which calculates the 
official poverty figures in Indonesia. They base their calculations on the data 
collected through the three yearly Consumption Module of SUSENAS (the 
National Socio-Economic Survey), with a sample of around 65,000 
households selected randomly from all over the country. The questionnaire 
in this detailed consumption module includes a total of 229 food and 110 
non-food items.  
BPS poverty line is consisted of two parts: the food poverty line and the non-
food poverty line.
17
 The food poverty line is set to achieve a caloric intake of 
2,100 calories per person per day. The value of this caloric intake is 
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 See BPS (2002). 
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calculated based on the consumption of a food poverty basket, which is 
consisted of 52 food commodities, by a pre-specified reference population. 
The reference population is consisted of all households within a range of 
nominal per capita expenditure, which is determined subjectively. The next 
step from here is to calculate the mean of actual caloric intake and the value 
of the food poverty basket consumed by the reference population. Then the 
food poverty line is calculated by multiplying the actual value of the food 
poverty basket consumption by the ratio of 2,100 to the actual caloric intake.  
Meanwhile, the non-food poverty line is obtained by first calculating the mean 
of actual consumption of a non-food poverty basket, which is consisted of 27 
non-food commodities, by the reference population. Then, for each 
commodity a scaling factor is independently determined to indicate the 
portion of the commodity consumption which is deemed essential.
18
 The 
range of the scaling factor is determined between 0 and 1. This scaling factor 
is then multiplied to the actual value of consumption of each commodity. The 
non-food poverty line is the sum of these values across the 27 commodities. 
Finally, the poverty line is obtained by summing up the food poverty line and 
the non-food poverty line.  
Although BPS has published the results of their calculations on the number 
of the poor in Indonesia since 1976, these numbers cannot be used as the 
basis for the analysis in this study for two reasons. First, BPS applies its 
poverty calculation method separately for urban and rural areas. This means 
that the resulting poverty lines for urban and rural areas represent different 
and not comparable welfare levels. Second, BPS each time repeat its 
poverty calculation method wholly, independent of its calculations in the 
previous years. This means that the poverty lines obtained each year again 
represent different and not comparable welfare levels. Due to these two 
drawbacks, the BPS poverty numbers are not comparable across regions 
and over time. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, an alternative source 
of poverty calculations which provides consistent and comparable welfare 
level has to be found from elsewhere.  
C.  Consistent Poverty Estimates 
To overcome the regional comparability problem, alternative sources that 
can be identified are Bidani and Ravallion (1993), Chesher (1998), and 
Pradhan et al. (2001). These three studies provide poverty figures for 
Indonesia which are based on a single poverty basket and, hence, represent 
comparable poverty measures across regions. Since Pradhan et al. (2001) 
provides the poverty figures for the latest year available, 1999, this study is 
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 This is based on a basic needs commodities survey (Survei Paket Komoditi Kebutuhan 
Dasar – SPKKD).  
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selected as the basis for calculating poverty figures used in the present 
study. Pradhan et al. (2001) use the same 52 commodities in the food 
poverty basket as BPS, but use the food-share based Engel curve method 
for calculating the non-food poverty basket. 
In terms of comparability over time, however, there is no alternative source 
readily available. This means that a consistent time series of poverty figures 
has to be calculated, using the 1999 poverty figures from Pradhan et al. 
(2001) as the basis. To calculate the poverty figures in the previous years, 
first it is necessary to construct a deflator which will be used to deflate the 
1999 poverty lines to the previous years. Following Suryahadi et al. (2000), 
this deflator is a re-weighted consumer price index (CPI) to reflect the share 
of food in the poverty basket. While the CPI has a 40 percent food share, 
this poverty line deflator has an 80 percent food share. 
Pradhan et al. (2001) calculate nominal poverty lines separately for urban 
and rural areas within each province. Ideally, each of this region specific 
poverty line is deflated using also region specific poverty line deflator. 
However, since the CPI in Indonesia is only available for urban areas, there 
is only one poverty line deflator available for each province. Therefore, both 
urban and rural poverty lines within one province are deflated using the same 
urban-based provincial poverty line deflator. The regional poverty lines 
obtained through this method are then applied to the Consumption Module 
SUSENAS data to calculate the poverty figures in the pre-1999 years.  
The results of the calculations for poverty headcount, aggregated at the 
national level, are shown in Figure 3. There was clearly a sharp reduction in 
both urban and rural poverty in Indonesia between 1984 and 1996. Despite 
continuously growing population, total poverty headcount dropped from 56.7 
percent in 1984 to 17.4 percent in 1996, a reduction by 39.3 percentage 
points in a twelve-year period. During the same period, urban poverty fell by 
22.2 percentage points from 29.3 percent in 1984 to 7.1 percent in 1996, 
while rural poverty fell by 41.8 percentage points from 65.1 percent in 1984 
to 23.3 percent in 1996. 
     14 
 
However, the crisis has evidently reversed the course of poverty reduction of 
the previous decade. Poverty in both urban and rural areas increased again 
between 1996 and 1999. The total poverty rate in 1999 was 27.0 percent, 
while urban and rural poverty rates were 16.3 and 33.9 percent respectively. 
In fact, reflecting the severity of the crisis, these 1999 total, rural, and 
particularly urban poverty levels are even higher than their respective 1993 
levels. This implies that in terms of poverty headcount, the lost time due to 
the crisis is more than six years.  
Other poverty measures calculated, the poverty gap index and the poverty 
severity index, are shown in Figures 4 and 5 respectively. Their trends show 
the same pattern as the poverty headcount. In both urban and rural areas, 
both poverty indices fell significantly during the period between 1984 and 
1996, but increased again between 1996 and 1999.  
Figure 3.  Headcount Poverty Rate
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Poverty gap indicates the total expenditure deficit of the poor to the poverty 
line averaged over the whole population. The total poverty gap fell 
substantially by 17.1 percentage points from 20.3 percent in 1984 to only 3.2 
percent in 1996. In urban areas, the gap fell by 7.9 percentage points from 9 
percent to 1.1 percent and in rural areas fell by 19.4 percentage points from 
23.8 percent to 4.4 percent during the same period. However, in 1999 the 
Figure 4.  Poverty Gap Index
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Figure 5.  Poverty Severity Index
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total, urban, and rural poverty gaps increased again to reach 5.4, 2.9, and 
6.9 percent respectively. Just like the poverty headcount, the crisis has 
brought back the poverty gap levels in 1999 even higher than their 1993 
levels, notably in urban areas. 
Poverty severity gives more weight to the poorest among the poor by 
squaring the expenditure deficit to the poverty line. The total poverty severity 
index also fell substantially from 9.5 percent in 1984 to 0.9 percent in 1996, a 
fall of 8.6 percentage points. During the same period, the poverty severity in 
urban areas fell by 3.7 percentage points from 4 to 0.3 percent, while in rural 
areas it fell by 10 percentage points from 11.2 percent to 1.2 percent. Like 
the other two poverty measures, the poverty severity has increased again in 
1999 due to the crisis. However, only in urban areas it reached a level higher 
than its 1993 level. 
While Figure 3 shows that the reduction in poverty headcount rate between 
1984 and 1996 occurred at a relatively steady rate, Figure 4 and more so 
Figure 5 show that the reduction in higher dimension poverty measures 
occurred much faster during the 1980s than in the 1990s. This indicates that 
during the 1980s there was a progress in reducing more severe forms of 
poverty. This also indicates that there was a significant improvement in 
income distribution among the poor during this period. 
D.  Sectoral Profile of Poverty 
It is well known that poverty in Indonesia is a phenomenon mainly found in 
rural areas, while in urban areas poverty is mainly found in the informal 
sector. Therefore, poverty in Indonesia is very much related to the 
agricultural sector. Table 2 shows poverty headcount rate and contribution to 
total poverty by main sector of occupation of household heads in 1987, 1996, 
and 1999.
19
 A comparison between the 1987 and 1996 sectoral profile of 
poverty will show how it is affected by growth, while the 1996 and 1999 
comparison will show how it is affected by the crisis.  
 
                                                 
19
 While the access to Consumption Module SUSENAS can be obtained starting from the 
1984 data, the access to Core SUSENAS – which provides household characteristics – can 
only be obtained starting from the 1987 data.  
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Table 2.  Poverty Headcount Rate and Contribution to Total Poor  
by Main Sector of Occupation in Indonesia, 1987-1999 (%) 
 Urban Rural Urban + Rural 
Sector Poverty 
Headcou
nt 
Contribution 
to total poor 
Poverty 
Headcou
nt 
Contribution 
to total poor 
Poverty 
Headcou
nt 
Contribution 
to total poor 
1987:       
Agriculture 51.7 15.6 58.5 69.7 58.2 61.8 
Industry 28.4 14.5 54.2 5.4 42.3 6.8 
Services 21.2 69.9 44.6 24.9 32.9 31.4 
Total 24.3 100.0 54.1 100.0 45.9 100.0 
       
1996:       
Agriculture 20.7 25.1 29.9 76.0 29.2 68.6 
Industry 7.1 13.2 18.1 5.7 12.6 6.8 
Services 5.6 61.7 12.7 18.3 8.7 24.6 
Total 7.1 100.0 23.3 100.0 17.4 100.0 
       
1999:       
Agriculture 33.6 18.9 40.1 70.5 39.5 58.1 
Industry 18.1 15.3 30.1 6.7 23.5 8.8 
Services 14.1 65.9 23.5 22.7 17.8 33.1 
Total 16.4 100.0 33.9 100.0 27.0 100.0 
 
The table shows clearly that during the whole period between 1987 and 
1999, in both urban and rural areas, the agricultural sector has always the 
highest poverty incidence compared to other sectors. In 1987, the poverty 
headcount rate in the agricultural sector was 58 percent, much higher than 
the poverty rates of 42 and 33 percent in the industrial and services sectors 
respectively. Disaggregation into urban and rural areas reveals a similar 
pattern.  
In terms of contribution to total poverty, 62 percent of the poor have a 
livelihood in the agricultural sector. In rural areas, around 70 percent of all 
the poor were in the agricultural sector. In urban areas, however, because 
agricultural households made up only a small fraction of the total 
households, the poor in agricultural sector made up only 16 percent of all the 
poor. In these areas, most of the poor were found in the services sector, the 
sector where most urban informal workers employed. 
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High economic growth between 1987 and 1996 obviously provided broad-
based benefits for the poor. As a result, the poverty headcount rate in the 
agricultural sector by 1996 was halved to 29 percent. However, it appears 
that poverty reduction in other sectors occurred even faster, so that the 
poverty rates in the industrial and services sectors in 1996 were only 13 and 
9 percent respectively. As a result, despite the reduction in poverty 
incidence, the contribution of the agricultural sector to total poverty increased 
to 69 percent. Similarly, in urban and rural areas the contribution of the 
agricultural sector to poverty increased to 25 and 76 percent respectively. 
The economic crisis reversed the declining trend in poverty and it occurred in 
all sectors, including agriculture. The poverty headcount rate in the 
agricultural sector increased again to reach 40 percent in 1999. In 
accordance with the urban and modern sector nature of the origin of the 
crisis, the proportionate increase in poverty in the industrial and services 
sectors was higher and the poverty rates in these sectors in 1999 reached 24 
and 18 percent respectively. Consequently, the contribution of the 
agricultural sector to poverty declined to 58 percent for total poverty and 
respectively 19 and 71 percent for urban and rural poverty.  
E.  Agriculture and the Probability of Being Poor 
The data has shown that most of the poor in Indonesia have a livelihood in 
the agricultural sector. This raises a question of whether people who have a 
livelihood in the agricultural sector have a higher tendency to become poor 
compared to those who have a livelihood outside the agricultural sector. That 
is, controlling for other characteristics, what is the probability a household 
which has a livelihood in the agricultural sector will be poor.  
To answer this question, Table 3 shows the results of estimating a probit 
model where the dependent variable is a dummy variable of whether a 
household is poor or not and the independent variables are various 
characteristics of the household, including whether or not the household 
is an agricultural household. The estimations were implemented again 
using data from SUSENAS for 1987, 1996, and 1999. As before, 
comparing the results between 1987 and 1996 estimations will show the 
impact of growth on the probability of being poor, while by comparing the 
results between 1996 and 1999 will show how the probability of being 
poor is affected by the crisis.  
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Table 3.  The Probability of Agricultural Households to be Poor 
(dependent variable:  dummy variable of poor household) 
Variables 1987 1996 1999 
Agricultural household 0.1609** 
(27.75) 
0.1064** 
(37.49) 
0.1249** 
(32.85) 
Urban location -0.1607** 
(-25.20) 
-0.0631** 
(-22.72) 
-0.0759** 
(-20.23) 
Household size 0.1628** 
(39.81) 
0.0698** 
(28.18) 
0.1150** 
(33.21) 
Household size square -0.0076** 
(-23.26) 
-0.0035** 
(-16.02) 
-0.0056** 
(-17.62) 
Household head 
characteristics: 
   
- Female 0.0536** 
(4.67) 
0.0533** 
(7.96) 
0.1109** 
(11.71) 
- Age -0.0139** 
(-13.68) 
-0.0067** 
(-13.33) 
-0.0125** 
(-17.75) 
- Age square 0.0001** 
(10.40) 
0.0001** 
(12.45) 
0.0001** 
(17.38) 
- Married -0.0122 
(-1.22) 
-0.0074 
(-1.32) 
0.0180* 
(2.34) 
Household head education 
level: 
   
- Not completed primary 
school 
   but literate 
-0.1178** 
(-18.05) 
-0.0266** 
(-4.74) 
-0.0537** 
(-5.51) 
- Completed primary school -0.1773** 
(-25.97) 
-0.0494** 
(-9.03) 
-0.0819** 
(-8.48) 
- Completed lower secondary  
   school 
-0.2499** 
(-30.92) 
-0.0645** 
(-12.49) 
-0.1139** 
(-12.39) 
- Completed upper secondary  
   school or higher 
-0.3332** 
(-43.49) 
-0.0452** 
(-8.02) 
-0.1191** 
(-12.39) 
    
Province dummy variables Yes Yes Yes 
    
Pseudo R-squared 0.3186 0.2125 0.1809 
Number of observations 50956 59852 60601 
 
Note:  - The command use is DPROBIT in STATA. 
 - The coefficients are in terms of probability of being poor. 
 - Numbers in parentheses are z-values. 
 - ** is significant at 1 percent level. 
 - * is significant at 5 percent level. 
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Table 3 shows that in 1987, controlling for other household characteristics, 
agricultural households had a 16 percent higher probability of becoming poor 
compared to non-agricultural households. This is consistent with the higher 
incidence of poverty in the agricultural sector vis a vis other sectors shown in 
Table 2. More importantly, this shows that the higher incidence of poverty in 
the agricultural sector cannot entirely be explained by the characteristics – 
such as the education level – of those who work in this sector relative to 
those who work in other sectors.  
Growth between 1987 and 1996 has brought down this probability of being 
poor. In 1996, agricultural households had 11 percent higher probability of 
becoming poor compared to non-agricultural households. This fall in the 
probability of being poor is in line with the reduction in poverty incidence in 
this sector during the period. However, the economic crisis has slightly 
increased again the probability to 12 percent in 1999.  
This probably has to do with the reversed migration that occurred during the 
first year of the crisis. Many of those who lost jobs in the modern sector in 
urban areas returned to the rural areas and rejoined the agricultural 
workforce. As a result, the agricultural sector had to cope with a sudden 
increase in its labor absorption, forcing down the marginal productivity of 
labor in this sector.
20
  
                                                 
20
 See Feridhanusetyawan (1999). 
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V.  The Impact of Economic Growth on Poverty 
The relationships between economic growth and poverty is one of the major 
themes in development literature and thinking in the 1990s. However, lack of 
sectoral emphasis in the macroeconomic approach gives little practical 
guidance to policy makers to make decisions about the allocation of public 
resources and sources of funds to finance public expenditures.
21
 The 
previous chapter shows that Indonesia experienced a fast reduction in 
poverty during high growth period in the 1980s and 1990s prior to the crisis. 
This chapter assesses how economic growth affects the observed reduction 
in poverty. In particular, whether sectoral composition of economic growth 
matters in determining its impact on poverty.  
Figure 6 shows the indices of total and sectoral real GDP in Indonesia from 
1984 to 1999. The figure shows that in the pre-crisis period between 1984 
and 1996, the total real GDP doubled. In terms of sectoral growth, the figure 
clearly shows that the real GDP growth of the industrial sector was the 
fastest, so that by 1996 the real GDP of this sector was almost three times 
its size in 1984. Meanwhile, the real GDP of both the agricultural and 
services sectors grew slower than the total real GDP and much slower than 
that of the industrial sector. The real GDP of these two sectors in 1996 was 
around 1.75 times their size in 1984.  
                                                 
21
 See Sarris (2001). 
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A.  Literature Review 
The basic model to estimate the impact of economic growth on poverty can 
be defined as: 
 

ydP            (2) 
where P  refers to the level of poverty rate and dP  refers to the change in 
poverty rate, 

y represents the rate of economic growth (that is 
Y
dY
y 

, with 
Y  is the level of GDP and dY  is its change),   is the error term, while   and 
  are parameters to be estimated. In particular, the parameter of interest is 
 , which shows the percentage point change in poverty rate due to one 
percent GDP growth. 
Using Indian national time-series data spanning from 1951 to 1991, 
Ravallion and Datt (1996) estimate various specifications and extensions of 
equation (2), but always forcing   = 0 and the growth variable is measured 
in per capita term. They find that, during the period of analysis, 85 percent of 
the reduction in poverty in India was due to agricultural growth.  
This finding is contrary to the finding of Quizon and Binswanger (1986, 
1989). Using a partial equilibrium multimarket model for India, they show that 
the agricultural growth effects of the Green revolution did not benefit the rural 
poor. They show that the main way to help the poor is to raise non-
agricultural incomes. Sarris (2001), however, criticizes their analysis since 
they only consider agricultural incomes and did not take into account 
Figure 6.  Index of Real GDP (1984 = 100)
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spillover effects to non-agricultural incomes. It is quite plausible that initial 
rises in agricultural incomes help increase the non-agricultural incomes, 
which eventually help the poor. 
A contrary finding to Ravallion and Datt (1996) is found by Warr and Wang 
(1999). Using national time-series data of Taiwan, they find that in this 
country it is the growth of the industrial sector which has the largest impact 
on poverty reduction. Different still, Warr (2002), by pooling the data from 
four Southeast Asian countries (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines), finds that it is the growth of the services sector which accounts 
for the largest reduction in poverty in these countries.  
The findings that the impact of sectoral growth on poverty differs across 
countries is consistent with the finding of Timmer (1997). He finds that the 
impact of agricultural growth on poverty depends on income distribution. He 
finds that income inequality affects the elasticity of poverty reduction with 
respect to different types of sectoral growth. In countries where the relative 
income inequality is large, the “elasticities of connection” of per capita 
income of the bottom quintile with respect to both agricultural and non-
agricultural labor productivity are very small and statistically insignificant. On 
the other hand, the elasticities for the top quintile are larger than one. In 
countries with small relative inequality, the elasticities are close to one for 
both bottom and top quintiles and slightly higher for agriculture. This implies  
that the contribution of agricultural growth to poverty reduction is a function 
of inequality, where more inequality leads to lower elasticity of connection.  
B.  Method 
Ravallion and Datt (1996) and War and Wang (1999) obviously have the 
advantage of available time-series data spanning a sufficiently long period to 
make empirical estimations of equation (2). However, the availability of long 
time-series data in developing countries is not the norm. In most countries, 
sufficiently long period time-series data to perform meaningful statistical 
analysis is not available. This has forced Warr (2002) to pool the data from 
four Southeast Asian countries: Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines. Such an approach, however, requires a strong assumption that 
the elasticities of poverty reduction to economic growth are the same across 
countries, which in many cases may be implausible. 
To circumvent the dual problems of the unavailability of sufficiently long time-
series national level data and the implausibility of pooling data across 
countries, this study employs a panel data with provinces as the unit of 
observations. However, this requires some adjustments in estimating the 
model to take into account the effect of migration across regions. This 
adjustment is necessary for the following reason. Suppose a province 
experienced high economic growth for a long period, but at the same time it 
attracted a large number of poor people from other provinces to migrate to 
this province. On the other hand, suppose another province experienced 
recession for a long period, which forced many of its poor people to migrate 
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out to other provinces in search of better life. Without controlling for the 
effect of the inter-provincial migration, the data may suggest that economic 
growth has a positive correlation with poverty, suggesting economic growth is 
associated with poverty increase.  
Let’s suppose that a country has a T number of provinces. Let’s define N  as 
the total number of population and PN as the total number of poor people in 
the country, while jN  and 
P
jN  refer to the number of population and number 
of poor people in each province respectively, so that TNNNN  .....21  
and PT
PPP NNNN  .....21 . Since: 
N
NNN
N
N
P
P
T
PPP 

.....21         (3) 
then: 
TT
T
P
TT
PP
PSPSPS
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
P  .......... 2211
2
22
1
11    (4) 
where jS  is the share of population in province j  and jP  is the poverty rate 
in province j . Equation (4) simply says that the national poverty rate is the 
average of provincial poverty rates weighted by the population share of each 
province. 
Similarly the change in national poverty rate can be decomposed by the 
changes in provincial poverty rates. Totally differentiating equation (4): 
   TTTT dSPdSPdSPdPSdPSdPSdP  .......... 22112211   (5) 
Equation (5) says that the change in national poverty rate is due to the 
changes in provincial poverty rates weighted by each province’s population 
share and the changes in provincial population share weighted by each 
province’s initial poverty rate. The terms in the second bracket identifies the 
change in national poverty rate due to differences in population growth 
across provinces – which may be due to differences in natural population 
growth as well as inter-provincial migration – and differences in each 
province’s initial poverty rate. 
Rearranging equation (5): 
     TTTT dSPdPSdSPdPSdSPdPSdP  .....22221111    (6) 
Each bracket in equation (6) identifies the total contribution of each province 
to the change in national poverty rate. Equations (5) and (6) suggest that in 
estimating equation (2) using provincial panel data, it is necessary to control 
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for each province’s population growth and initial poverty rate.
22
 Therefore, 
the model to be estimated becomes: 
 

jjjj
PnydP         (7) 
where jn

 is the population growth at the province j .  
To test the hypothesis that different sectoral growth affects poverty reduction 
differently, first let’s decompose the total economic growth in each province 
into its sectoral components. Since Sj
I
j
A
jj dYdYdYdY  , then: 

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where the superscript  SIAk ,,  indexes the agricultural, industrial, and 
services sector respectively and kH  is the sectoral share of GDP.  
Substituting equation (8) into equation (7) result in the model of sectoral 
growth impact on poverty reduction: 
 












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

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A
j PnyHyHyHdP   (9) 
If SIA   , then equation (9) collapses to equation (7), suggesting that 
sectoral composition of economic growth does not matter to its impact on 
poverty. Otherwise, it does matter because the growth of each sector affects 
poverty differently. The advantage of this method is that the estimated 
elasticities encompass all direct and indirect effects of growth on poverty, 
including income distribution and general equilibrium effects.   
C.  Empirical Estimations 
The SUSENAS databases are used to calculate the provincial level poverty 
measures, which are then merged with the regional GDP (RGDP) database 
to create a panel with province as the unit of observation. This provincial 
panel database is used to estimate the models of economic growth impact 
on poverty discussed above. The dependent variable is change in poverty, 
                                                 
22
 Ravallion and Datt (1999) find that initial conditions do not affect the elasticities of poverty 
to farm yields and development spending. However, the non-farm growth process is more 
pro-poor in Indian states with initially higher farm productivity, higher rural living standards 
relative to urban areas, and higher literacy. 
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while the independent variables are either total GDP growth (equation (7)) or 
share weighted sectoral GDP growth (equation (9)), supplemented by 
population growth and initial poverty level as control variables. The 
estimation method used is the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The inclusion 
of initial poverty level as a control variable removes the need to control for 
individual province fixed-effects as this variable has the same value within a 
province across time period.  
Table 4 presents the results of estimations using poverty headcount as the 
measure of poverty. Column heading “Total Growth” shows the results of 
estimations of equation (7), while column heading “Sectoral Growth” shows 
the results of estimations of equation (9). A precaution is warranted in 
interpreting the coefficients. The interpretation of the total GDP growth is 
straightforward. It shows the percentage point change in poverty due to one 
percent economic growth. However, the interpretation of the sectoral GDP 
growth is not so straightforward as the independent variables in equation (9) 
are sectoral economic growth weighted by their GDP share. If it is assumed 
that the whole economy is consisted of only a particular sector, then the 
weight of that sector is one and the weight of the other sectors are zero. In 
this case equation (9) will also collapse to equation (7). Hence, the 
coefficient of a particular sector GDP growth can be interpreted as the 
percentage point change in poverty due to one percent growth of that sector 
conditional on the whole economy is consisted only of that particular sector.  
 
     27 
Table 4.  The Impact of Economic Growth on Poverty Headcount 
 
Independent  
Variables 
Total Growth Sectoral Growth 
Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Total Poverty Headcount:       
Total GDP growth -0.0254 -0.90     
Agricultural GDP Growth    -1.8595 -3.62 ** 
Industrial GDP Growth    -0.0664 -1.63  
Services GDP Growth    0.0048 0.09  
Total population growth 0.0653 2.37 * 0.1193 3.93 ** 
Initial poverty headcount -0.1316 -2.96 ** -0.1085 -2.55 ** 
Constant 0.0189 0.78  0.0524 2.16 * 
       
Number of observations 130   130   
F-test 5.43 **  7.16 **  
R-squared 0.1144   0.224   
 
Urban Poverty Headcount:       
Total GDP growth -0.0095 -0.42     
Agricultural GDP Growth    -1.1254 -2.84 ** 
Industrial GDP Growth    -0.0624 -1.90 * 
Services GDP Growth    0.0268 0.58  
Urban population growth 0.0062 0.17  0.0474 1.23  
Initial poverty headcount -0.1497 -3.33 ** -0.1356 -3.13 ** 
Constant 0.0165 1.03  0.0352 2.16 * 
       
Number of observations 130   130   
F-test 3.81 **  5.12 **  
R-squared 0.0832   0.1711   
 
Rural Poverty Headcount:       
Total GDP growth -0.0230 -0.72     
Agricultural GDP Growth    -2.8789 -4.56 ** 
Industrial GDP Growth    -0.0598 -1.33  
Services GDP Growth    0.0315 0.50  
Rural population growth 0.0479 2.23 * 0.1046 4.45 ** 
Initial poverty headcount -0.1373 -2.58 ** -0.1393 -2.85 ** 
Constant 0.0320 1.00  0.1066 3.22 ** 
       
Number of observations 125   125   
F-test 4.2 **  7.95 **  
R-squared 0.0942   0.2505   
Notes:  ** = significant at 1 percent level 
             * = significant at 5 percent level 
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The results of estimations indicate that the coefficient of total GDP growth is 
negative – indicating that economic growth is poverty reducing – but 
statistically insignificant. This is true for total, urban, as well as rural poverty. 
The sectoral economic growth, however, conveys a different story. The 
coefficients of agricultural, industrial, and services GDP growths are clearly 
significantly different from each other. This means that the sectoral 
composition of economic growth does matter in determining the impact of 
economic growth on poverty.  
Agricultural growth has negative and statistically significant coefficients for 
total, urban, and rural poverty and the magnitudes of the coefficients are 
much larger than those of the other sectors. Industrial growth also has 
negative coefficients, but only statistically significant for urban areas. 
Meanwhile, services growth has positive but relatively small and insignificant 
coefficients. These coefficients indicate that agricultural growth has the 
strongest impact on reducing total, urban, and rural poverty. Industrial growth 
also tends to reduce poverty, but its impact is significant only on reducing 
urban poverty. Finally, it appears that services growth has no impact on 
poverty. This finding clearly contradicts the finding of Warr (2002) that 
services growth is important in reducing poverty in Indonesia.  
Using poverty gap, Table 5 shows the results of estimations of the same 
models. Like poverty headcount, the impact of total GDP growth on poverty 
gap is negative but statistically not significant. In terms of sectoral growth, 
agricultural growth again has the strongest, negative, and statistically 
significant impact on total, urban, and rural poverty gap. Industrial growth 
also has negative impact but none of its coefficients in reducing total, urban, 
and rural poverty gap is statistically significant. As in poverty headcount, 
services growth is of no consequence to poverty gap.  
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Table 5.  The Impact of Economic Growth on Poverty Gap 
 
Independent Total Growth Sectoral Growth 
Variables Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Total Poverty Gap:       
Total GDP growth -0.0068 -0.49     
Agricultural GDP Growth    -0.6605 -2.54 ** 
Industrial GDP Growth    -0.0200 -0.97  
Services GDP Growth    0.0039 0.14  
Total population growth 0.0332 2.46 * 0.0524 3.41 ** 
Initial poverty gap -0.1690 -4.23 ** -0.1535 -3.87 ** 
Constant 0.0045 0.52  0.0177 1.84  
       
Number of observations 130   130   
F-test 8.5 **  7 **  
R-squared 0.1683   0.2202   
 
Urban Poverty Gap:       
Total GDP growth -0.0030 -0.41     
Agricultural GDP Growth    -0.2624 -2.01 * 
Industrial GDP Growth    -0.0129 -1.19  
Services GDP Growth    0.0044 0.29  
Urban population growth 0.0000 0.00  0.0097 0.77  
Initial poverty gap -0.1707 -4.44 ** -0.1660 -4.37 ** 
Constant 0.0035 0.76  0.0082 1.67  
       
Number of observations 130   130   
F-test 6.64 **  5.31 **  
R-squared 0.1365   0.1764   
 
Rural Poverty Gap:       
Total GDP growth -0.0039 -0.25     
Agricultural GDP Growth    -1.0244 -3.13 ** 
Industrial GDP Growth    -0.0191 -0.82  
Services GDP Growth    0.0185 0.57  
Rural population growth 0.0274 2.59 ** 0.0476 3.91 ** 
Initial poverty headcount -0.1729 -3.92 ** -0.1641 -3.84 ** 
Constant 0.0082 0.78  0.0326 2.63 ** 
       
Number of observations 125   125   
F-test 7.62 **  7.24 **  
R-squared 0.1589   0.2333   
Notes:  ** = significant at 1 percent level 
             * = significant at 5 percent level 
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Finally, Table 6 shows the results of estimations of the models of economic 
growth impact on poverty using poverty severity as the measure poverty. 
Like poverty headcount and poverty gap, total GDP growth has negative but 
statistically insignificant impact on poverty severity. Furthermore, sectoral 
growth does not have statistically significant impact on poverty severity, 
except for agricultural growth in rural areas.  
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Table 6.  The Impact of Economic Growth on Poverty Severity 
 
Independent Total Growth Sectoral Growth 
Variables Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Total Poverty Severity:       
Total GDP growth -0.0022 -0.26     
Agricultural GDP Growth    -0.2079 -1.25  
Industrial GDP Growth    -0.0079 -0.60  
Services GDP Growth    -0.0028 -0.15  
Total population growth 0.0169 2.01 * 0.0229 2.34 * 
Initial poverty severity -0.1820 -4.31 ** -0.1730 -4.02 ** 
Constant 0.0011 0.24  0.0060 1.06  
       
Number of observations 130   130   
F-test 7.9 **  5.21 **  
R-squared 0.1582   0.1737   
 
Urban Poverty Severity:       
Total GDP growth -0.0013 -0.39     
Agricultural GDP Growth    -0.1018 -1.69  
Industrial GDP Growth    -0.0044 -0.88  
Services GDP Growth    0.0009 0.12  
Urban population growth 0.0008 0.16  0.0047 0.80  
Initial poverty severity -0.1807 -4.96 ** -0.1782 -4.91 ** 
Constant 0.0008 0.42  0.0027 1.23  
       
Number of observations 130   130   
F-test 8.25 **  5.82 **  
R-squared 0.1642   0.1899   
 
Rural Poverty Severity:       
Total GDP growth -0.0012 -0.13     
Agricultural GDP Growth    -0.4545 -2.30 * 
Industrial GDP Growth    -0.0078 -0.56  
Services GDP Growth    0.0090 0.46  
Rural population growth 0.0157 2.53 ** 0.0247 3.38 ** 
Initial poverty severity -0.1841 -4.32 ** -0.1732 -4.09 ** 
Constant 0.0025 0.47  0.0131 1.94 * 
       
Number of observations 125   125   
F-test 8.63 **  6.6 **  
R-squared 0.1762   0.2170   
Notes:  ** = significant at 1 percent level 
             * = significant at 5 percent level 
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D.  Agriculture Contribution to Poverty Reduction 
The results of the estimations have shown that agricultural growth is the 
strongest factor in reducing poverty in Indonesia. But how much is actually 
the contribution of the agricultural sector to poverty reduction? To answer 
this question, Table 7 calculates the contribution of agricultural growth to 
poverty reduction in Indonesia using the estimated coefficients and other 
empirical data. The calculation is exercised for the period of 1984-1996 only 
as this is the high growth period where the poverty reduction has occurred, 
while the 1996-1999 period is a crisis period where poverty increased.  
Table 7.  The Contribution of Agricultural Growth to Poverty Reduction,  
1984-1996 
 Urban Rural Total 
Poverty Headcount:    
- Observed change in poverty (% point) -22.14 -41.82 -39.24 
- Impact of agricultural growth (% point) -12.16 -31.12 -25.74 
- Contribution of agricultural growth (%) 54.94 74.40 65.58 
    
Poverty Gap:    
- Observed change in poverty (% point) -7.87 -19.38 -17.08 
- Impact of agricultural growth (% point) -2.84 -11.07 -8.73 
- Contribution of agricultural growth (%) 36.05 57.15 51.13 
    
Poverty Severity:    
- Observed change in poverty (% point) - -9.98 - 
- Impact of agricultural growth (% point) - -4.91 - 
- Contribution of agricultural growth (%) - 49.22 - 
 
In Table 7, the “Observed change in poverty” shows the actual reduction in 
poverty between 1984 and 1996 in terms of percentage point change. The 
numbers are obtained from Figures 3 to 5 for the respective measure of 
poverty. The “Impact of agricultural growth” is calculated by multiplying the 
estimated coefficients in Tables 4 to 6 with the share of agricultural GDP 
from the total GDP and the growth of agricultural GDP. To take into account 
varying share and growth of agricultural GDP from period to period, the 
calculation is done sequentially for each three-year period. The numbers 
shown in the table are the cumulative results for the whole period between 
1984 and 1996. To obtain consistent estimates of poverty change across 
regions, the calculations are done separately for urban and rural poverty, 
while the change in total poverty is obtained as the population weighted 
average of the changes in urban and rural poverty. Finally, the “Contribution 
of agricultural growth” is the ratio of the latter to earlier row, which shows the 
contribution of agricultural GDP growth to poverty reduction. 
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The results show that indeed agricultural growth has been the most 
important factor contributing to rapid poverty reduction experienced by 
Indonesia during the high growth pre-crisis period. In terms of poverty 
headcount, agricultural growth accounts for 66 percent of total poverty 
reduction, 55 percent of urban poverty reduction, and 74 percent of rural 
poverty reduction. In terms of poverty gap, agricultural growth accounts for 
51, 36, and 57 percent respectively of total, urban, and rural poverty gap 
reduction. Meanwhile, for poverty severity only the reduction in rural areas is 
calculated as only for these areas the coefficient is statistically significant. It 
appears that 49 percent of reduction in poverty severity in rural areas is due 
to agricultural growth. 
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VI.  Poverty Reduction Programs: A Brief Overview 
 
The previous chapter shows that economic growth, in particular agricultural 
growth, is the major factor behind poverty reduction experienced by 
Indonesia during the pre-crisis high growth era. The analysis, however, also 
indicates that economic growth does not explain all of the observed 
reduction in poverty. One factor that may have had significant contributions 
to the poverty reduction is direct efforts by the government at various levels 
to reduce poverty through poverty reduction or anti-poverty programs. This 
chapter briefly describes such programs, including the recently established 
social safety net programs as a response to the recent economic crisis.  
A.  General Approach of Development 
Despite a number of idiosyncratic flaws and important weaknesses,
23
 during 
the pre-crisis high growth period Indonesia made substantial improvements 
in social development and poverty reduction. As has been discussed in the 
previous chapters, the number of poor people dropped sharply during the 
period. In the education sector, between 1973 and 1983 gross enrollment 
rate for primary school increased from 82 to 109 percent and for junior 
secondary enrollment school increased from 24 to 52 percent. In the health 
sector, infant and child mortality rates fell, nutrition status improved, and 
average family size declined.  
These achievements were partly due to rising incomes, which made it 
possible for households as well as the government to spend more on 
education and health. However, government policies also played significant 
role, including the approach followed by the New Order government in its 
early establishment in the late 1960s which concentrated its focus almost 
exclusively on the agricultural sector at least until the 1970s. This policy was 
implemented in a massive rural development program (focussed particularly 
on Java), including a rice intensification campaign and widespread 
expansion of rural infrastructure. 
In addition, the success in stimulating growth in line with poverty reduction 
was also attributed to substantial investment in economic and social 
infrastructure, which in turn supported broad-based growth. This included 
investment in human capital, especially basic education and public health 
through INPRES (Presidential Instruction) grants, including the 1974 Primary 
                                                 
23
 The abuse of centralized control and top-down decision making during the New Order 
created extraordinary profits for certain groups. The same system was also used to form 
marketing monopolies, to channel bank credit into privileged firms and to “reserved” 
sectors, to seize communal land and allocate them to “development” projects, as well as to 
manipulate government contracts. Lack of transparency in the government was also 
evident.  
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School INPRES whose objective was to build “a primary school in every 
village”.
24
 Through this INPRES more than 60,000 primary schools were built 
in five years between 1973 and 1978. 
B.  Poverty Focused Programs 
It is important to note, however, that poverty alleviation was never explicitly 
set as a development goal during the first five rounds of the ‘Five Year 
Development Plan – PELITA’ between 1969 and 1994. Only in 1994, in 
PELITA VI, for the first time did the government identify explicitly targets for 
reduction and eventual total elimination of poverty. A number of nation-wide 
and regional poverty eradication programs were devised to achieve the 
objectives.
25
 Some of these new and more direct major anti-poverty 
programs were:   
1) The Presidential Instruction on Disadvantaged Villages (INPRES IDT), 
the Disadvantaged Village Infrastructure Development Program (P3DT), 
and the IDT Nutritional Program for school children. The objective of the 
IDT program was to accelerate poverty reduction in less developed 
village across Indonesia. The programs started in 1993, and provides a 
grant of Rp 20 million to Rp 60 million for each village deemed to have 
been left behind by the development process. The funds were intended 
to be given to the community to undertake grass-roots poverty alleviation 
activities. Linked to the IDT programs were P3DT which provides 
infrastructure block grant funds directly to the villages. The key elements 
of these two programs were an increased emphasis on village-level 
participation. In addition, the IDT program was complemented by a food 
supplement program for primary school children which targeted 
impoverished families. 
2) Family Welfare Development Program through TAKESRA/KUKESRA 
(saving and credit) program. In this program, which was managed by the 
National Family Planning Coordinating Body (BKKBN), the ‘poor’ families 
were first invited to join the TAKESRA (prosperous family saving) saving 
fund, with initial savings of Rp 2,000. They can then obtain credit 
(KUKESRA) for an amount up to 10 times the family’s TAKESRA 
balance. In the following stage, 10 percent of the Rp 20,000 loan was 
deducted, and added to the savings now totaling Rp 4,000. With these 
savings, the second amount of credit available is up to Rp 40,000. 
                                                 
24
 INPRES is a grant mechanism system which allowed direct grants to be made by the 
central government to the local government. For discussions on the Primary School 
INPRES, see Duflo (2000). 
25
 Daly and Fane (2002) define ‘anti-poverty programs’ as the programs whose benefits are 
specifically targeted at the poor. 
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Following this process the credit ceiling for the program is Rp 360,000 
per family.  
3) Income Generating Project for Marginal Farmers and the Landless (P4K 
— Proyek Peningkatan Pendapatan Petani Kecil). The program is 
intended to increase incomes of small farmers through self-help groups, 
and to organize them to gain access to credit. Other micro finance 
programs being utilized to provide access to financial resources for the 
poor include BKK, BKPD, and Lumbung Pitih Nagari.  
4) Urban Poverty Reduction Program (P2KP – Program Pengentasan 
Kemiskinan Perkotaan) and Kecamatan Development Program (KDP). 
The aims of these programs was to foster more democratic and 
participatory forms of local governance by strengthening sub-district 
(kecamatan) and village capacities and improving community 
participation in development projects. KDP provides block grants of 
approximately US$ 43,000 to US$ 125,000 per year directly to 
kecamatans and villages for small-scale infrastructure and economic 
activities.  
In addition to these four major programs, there are also many other small 
programs carried out by various line agencies and regional governments.
26
 
While not free from weaknesses, these programs in theory have been more 
effective than general program (like fuel subsidy) because they focus on 
target groups, such as poor people and households. 
C.  Crisis Response Social Safety Net Programs 
As mentioned earlier, beginning in mid 1997, Indonesia suffered a sharp, 
deep set of currency, financial, economic, natural, and political crises. While 
the initial responses to the social consequences of the crises were tepid and 
localized, by July 1998 civil disturbances and the fall of then President 
Soeharto convinced the new government to quickly deploy large-scale social 
safety nets (SSN) program. This includes: (i) Cheap Rice Program (OPK), (ii) 
Employment Creation Programs, (iii) Education SSN Programs, (iv) Health 
SSN Programs, and (v) Community Empowerment Program (PDMDKE).
27
  
                                                 
26
 In a case study to identify poverty programs in Central Java, the authors found a 
surprisingly large number of programs aimed at overcoming poverty. More than 30 anti-
poverty programs were discovered during the field work in Central Java in 1997. The large 
number of programs shows, on the one hand, the size of the government effort to 
overcome poverty. On the other, it raises questions about how the government agencies 
can integrate and coordinate such a large number of activities in the field.   
27
 Daly and Fane (2002) also include the government programs to compensate the poor from 
reduced subsidies for domestic fuel prices starting in 2000 as anti-poverty programs.  
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These programs were intended to help protect the traditionally poor as well 
as the newly poor due to the crisis through four strategies: (i) ensuring the 
availability of food at affordable prices for the poor, (ii) supplementing 
purchasing power among poor households through employment creation, (iii) 
preserving access of the poor to critical social services, particularly health 
and education, and (iv) sustaining local economic activity through regional 
block grant programs and extension of small scale credits.
28
  
The programs launched were designed by the central government and were 
intended to encompass the following characteristics: quick disbursement, 
direct financing to beneficiaries, transparency, accountability, and 
participatory.
29
 In the fiscal year (FY) 1998/99, a total budget of Rp 9.4 trillion 
was allocated to fund the SSN programs, while it was only Rp 3.2 trillion 
allocated for FY 2000. This reduction was due to the mild improvement of the 
economy and also because of the shorter FY 2000 (only 9 instead of 12 
months due to the change in fiscal year period). A brief description of each 
major program is discussed below.
30
  
Cheap Rice Program (OPK). This program is the main component of the 
government effort to maintain food security. It is particularly aimed at helping 
the poor and the ‘newly’ poor because of the crisis obtaining food, hindered 
by both falling real income and food price escalation. This program is 
popularly called the “OPK” program, an acronym of Operasi Pasar Khusus, 
which literally means ‘special market operation’, but it is more commonly 
known as the Cheap Rice Program.
31
  
Under this program, each eligible household can purchase 10 kilograms of 
rice per month at a highly subsidized price of Rp. 1,000/kg.
32
 For 
comparison, the average market price for medium quality rice in the second 
half of 1998 was around Rp. 3,000/kg.
33
 Originally, only households under 
the lowest category of the official classification were eligible to participate in 
                                                 
28
 Sumarto, Suryahadi, and Widyanti (2002).  
29
 At least as shown by some anecdotal evidence, these intended characteristics were not 
always achieved. See for example Tim Dampak Krisis SMERU (2000).  
30
 There were some changes in JPS programs across fiscal years.  
31
 The program was introduced in July 1998 in Jakarta area and then expanded to all over 
the country. 
32
 The benefit was later increased to 20 kilograms and then changed again to between 10 
and 20 kilograms. 
33
 See ‘Recent Volatility in the Rice Market: Results of a SMERU Rapid Appraisal in Central 
and East Java’, SMERU Newsletter, No. 01, November 1998.  
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the program.
34
 But coverage was expanded to include the second lowest 
category during the course of the year.  
Since this program endeavors to ensure that the poor can afford to buy rice, 
which is the staple food of most Indonesians, it is probably the most critical 
component of the JPS programs. One impact of the crisis was a sharp 
increase in prices, particularly for those foods, which made basic necessities 
practically out to reach of the poor, at least in the very short run before their 
nominal incomes could expand to keep pace. The provisions of cheap rice 
for the poor, therefore, were deemed essential in avoiding widespread 
hunger, which might exacerbate the already chaotic political and economic 
situation of the country at that time.
35
  
Employment Creation. This program is popularly known as padat karya 
(which means, as an adjective, ‘labor intensive’) program. This actually is not 
a single program but a large set of activities under the category of 
employment creation. These programs were created as a response to the 
threat of burgeoning unemployment due to economic contraction, which 
forced many firms to either lay off workers or shutdown completely. In 
accordance with the urban nature of the crisis, the initial geographical targets 
for the first round of padat karya ‘crash programs’ in the 1997/98 fiscal year 
were directed to urban areas and some rural areas which experienced 
harvest failures.
36
  
Following these ‘crash programs’, in the 1998/99 fiscal year there was a 
proliferation of “padat karya” programs, where 16 different programs fell into 
the ‘employment creation’ category.
37
  These programs can be classified into 
four types.  First, some programs were a redesigning of on-going investment 
and infrastructure projects into more labor intensive type projects and modes 
of contracts. Second, other programs gave block grants to local communities 
(such as the Kecamatan Development Program, Village Infrastructure 
Project, and PDM-DKE Program). These funds were directed to poorer 
areas, and had ‘menus’ for the utilization of the funds that included the 
possibility of public works with a labor creating effect. A third set were special 
                                                 
34
 The official classification was created by the national family planning organization 
(BKKBN).  
35
 Since the amount of rice was substantially below total consumption, in practice the 
program served as equivalent to an income transfer. However, since the price was fixed in 
nominal terms, the magnitude of the income transfer was scaled to the needs for food. In 
this sense the program can be seen as a combination of income transfer and food security. 
36
 These ‘crash programs’ were launched in December 1997 and lasted until the end of the 
fiscal year in March 1998.  
37
 In the fiscal year 1999/2000, however, padat karya programs were cut back to only two 
programs: the ‘Public Work Sector Padat Karya Program’ and the ‘Special Initiative for 
Unemployed Women Program’.  
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labor intensive works carried out by sectoral ministries (e.g. forestry, rural-
urban, and retraining of laid off workers carried out by the Manpower 
Ministry). In addition, there was a fourth type of program, which were ‘food 
for work’ programs, typically launched by international donors and NGOs in 
drought stricken areas.  
Scholarships and Block Grants to Schools. At the earlier stage of the crisis 
there was a worry that the crisis may force parents to withdraw their children 
from schools as a way to cope with falling incomes and rising costs, hence 
triggering a large increase in school drop out rates. This rightly alarmed the 
government, which then led it to establish an education funding support 
program. The program was started in the academic year 1998/99 and there 
is a plan to end the program in the year 2003.  
This program has two components, one is scholarships for students from 
poor families to enable them to stay in schools, and the other is block grants 
to schools to help them continue operating. The scholarships provide cash of 
Rp. 10,000, Rp. 20,000 and Rp. 25,000 per month for primary, lower 
secondary, and upper secondary school students respectively. These 
amounts generally cover the cost of school fees and can be used for that 
purpose or to cover other expenses.  
This program was intended to reach at most 6 percent of primary school 
students, 17 percent of lower secondary school students, and 10 percent of 
upper secondary school students nationwide, including students from 
religious schools. Since the program was targeted, it is expected that the 
coverage will be higher in some districts and lower in others. Meanwhile, the 
60 percent poorest schools in each district were targeted to receive the block 
grants.  
Health. There was concern early in the crisis that falling real income and 
increasing costs of medical services due to the crisis might force poor and 
new poor households abandon modern medical services, even when they 
needed. This would make the general society’s health conditions deteriorate, 
reversing improvements made during the past decades.  
In anticipation of this, the government established JPS programs in the 
health sector, known as JPS-BK (JPS Bidang Kesehatan or ‘Health Sector 
JPS’) programs. Through these programs it was hoped that the poor would 
not be forced to stop using modern medical services. Various activity 
programs which were specifically established to achieve this health objective 
have provided subsidies for medicines and imported medical equipment, 
operational support funds for community health centers, free medical and 
family planning services, and supplementary food for pregnant women and 
children under three years old.  
Based on continuous qualitative and quantitative monitoring by the SMERU 
Research Institute and other groups, Sumarto and Pritchett (2001) identified 
five lessons from Indonesia’s experience in the design of such safety nets 
     40 
during times of crisis. These are: (i) Institutional commitment, clear 
objectives, and simple design are key to the success of programs; (ii) Even 
with a simple design, local flexibility is needed; (iii) No safety net using static 
administrative targeting will catch those households suffering sudden shocks; 
(iv) Some ideas that work well as poverty or development programs fail as 
crisis safety nets – especially micro credit projects; and (v) Monitoring 
expenditure a crisis creates is important, because the worst safety nets may 
be the biggest spenders.  
D.  The Institutional Set up of Poverty Programs 
While safety net programs were scrutinized to ensure good design and 
effective targeting, the Indonesian government spent three times as much on 
bailing out the financial sector and five times as much on a general subsidy 
for energy that neither benefited the poor nor the hardest hit households. 
The question of whether to spend more on safety net programs depends, in 
part at least, on the alternatives. While governments and donors often 
jealously guard the (often) minimal funds budgeted for safety nets, the much 
greater sums that are usually available in the general budget’s fiscal trough 
are less well protected and often consumed by powerful financial and elite 
interests. 
At the beginning of April 2001, during the President Abdurrahman Wahid 
administration, the government formed the Poverty Reduction Coordination 
Board (Badan Koordinasi Penanggulangan Kemiskinan – BKPK). 
Institutionally, this board existed under the coordination of the Vice President 
of the day, Megawati Sukarnoputri.  The primary objective of the BKPK was 
to coordinate the poverty reduction programs more effectively and in an 
integrated manner.  To carry out their function, the BKPK undertook four 
main roles: as coordinator, the catalyst, mediator, and facilitator.   
In December 2001, through Presidential Decision No.124/2001, 
Megawati, after replacing Wahid as president, established the Poverty 
Reduction Committee (KPK), dissolving the BKPK. The Coordinating 
Minister for Peoples Welfare and Poverty Alleviation heads the 
committee. Articles 4 and 5 of this decree state that the function of the 
committee is to “take concrete measures to accelerate the reduction in 
the number of poor people in all regions of Indonesia. The function of the 
KPK is to create policy, monitor, and report on poverty alleviation to the 
President. The Secretariat of this committee is based in BAPPENAS (the 
National Development Planning Board).  
Promises to develop a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) were 
pledged in November 2001 at the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) 
meetings of donors and the government. It is this committee (KPK) that is 
responsible for the production of the PRSP. So far it appears that buying for 
the PRSP at both the political and bureaucratic levels remains elusive.  
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Independently of the PRSP, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) must 
prepare an action plan for poverty reduction as part of its basis for 
accountability in 2004 for the Propenas (National Development Program) 
and the 2003 and 2004 Repeta – which is the national planning 
mechanisms.  This will be an interim strategy, and BAPPENAS is 
responsible for creating the policy and devising the mechanisms to 
operationalize it.  
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VII.  Conclusion and Implication 
Indonesia experienced a rapid poverty reduction during the pre-crisis period. 
This rapid reduction in poverty in Indonesia has generally been attributed to 
the pre-crisis high economic growth experienced by the country. However, 
the advent of an economic crisis since mid 1997, which has caused poverty 
to increase again quickly, has led to a questioning on the emphasis on 
industrialization as Indonesia’s development strategy.  
As in other developing countries, most of the poor in Indonesia are located in 
rural areas and have a livelihood in the agricultural sector. The finding of this 
study shows that, after controlling for other characteristics, a person who has 
a livelihood in the agricultural sector indeed has a higher probability to 
become poor than those who have a livelihood in non-agricultural sectors. It 
appears that the development strategy emphasizing industrialization was 
aimed at developing a high productivity industrial sector, which hopefully will 
pull out people from the low productivity agricultural sector and, hence, 
rescue them from poverty.  
The findings of this study indicate that this strategy has not worked well for 
two related reasons. First, as the industrial sector expanded and the 
importance of the agricultural sector in the economy quickly diminished, as 
evident from its share of GDP, the movement of people out of the agricultural 
sector into the industrial sector has not occurred as fast. This failure of the 
industrial sector to absorb a larger fraction of the workforce has left the 
agricultural sector with sizable fraction of the workforce while its relative size 
in the economy was quickly diminishing.  
Second, it turns out that agricultural growth is a much more potent factor 
in reducing poverty than industrial growth. Even in urban areas, where 
industrial sector has a significant impact on poverty reduction, the impact 
of agricultural growth on reducing poverty is still much bigger. As a result, 
during the pre-crisis high growth period of 1984-1996, it is estimated that 
agricultural growth accounts for 66 percent of total poverty reduction, 55 
percent of urban poverty reduction, and 74 percent of rural poverty 
reduction.  
These findings have important implications for policy to eliminate poverty in 
Indonesia. First, it is clear that direct efforts to push agricultural growth is the 
most effective channel to reduce poverty. Second, the strategy of 
industrialization should be directed at developing industries that have strong 
linkages with the agricultural sector, such as the agro-industries, so that 
industrial growth will have bigger impact on reducing poverty.  
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At the very least, government should create an enabling environment to 
encourage private sector participation in the agribusiness development. 
Hence, agricultural policies that harm agro-industries – including the 
imposition of high tariffs on imported inputs for agro-industries, export taxes 
on agricultural products, and restrictions of interregional trade of agricultural 
commodities – should be removed.  
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